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ABSTRACT
The aim of the current research is to understand how different perspectives in a
violent event can affect empathy, violence sensitivity, and word usage. Participants
(N=289 University of Rhode Island undergraduate students) were randomly assigned
to the perspective (victim, bystander, and perpetrator) and media by which they
learned about a violent event (watching a video or reading a news article), and were
asked to answer a few open-ended questions about the event, followed by a short
survey. Results showed that for the words in the categories of negative emotion, anger,
first person pronoun, and affective process, participants assigned to the perpetrator and
victim perspectives used the words at a similar rate, and participants in the bystander
perspective used the words of these categories less. Participants who watched the
video used more words in the personal pronoun (first, second, and third person
pronoun), first person pronoun (e.g., I, me), and negative emotion categories. Results
did not show differences between the groups for the subscales of empathy, and for the
categories of violence sensitivity. Separate ANCOVAS suggested group differences
based on perspective in violence severity for physical violent behaviors, and group
differences based on media in violence severity for nonphysical violent behaviors.
There were also main effects for perspective and media on violence sensitivity total.
Participants assigned to the bystander perspective who watched the video clip were
less violence sensitive. Finally, there was a significant correlation between empathy
total and violence sensitivity total. Overall, results suggest that bystanders perceive
events differently than perpetrators and victims, and participants who read are more

violence sensitive and empathetic. The results of this study could be applied in the
development of bystander intervention and violence prevention programs.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Much of the recent news is about violence and different forms of violence:
mass shootings, terrorist attacks, domestic and sexual violence, bullying and cyberbullying, and the list continues. Some of the violence might even be socially
acceptable such as what is seen in different sports, including boxing, hockey, football,
or rugby. Some of these news stories affect and captivate our attention more than
others. A possible reason for why some news affects us strongly is that someone we
know or ourselves is being directly affected by this type of violence. The way people
can be involved and affected by a violent event can vary. A person can be the
perpetrator, that is, the person inflicting harm on purpose, the victim, the person who
is being harmed, or the bystander, a person who is witnessing harm being done to
someone else.
Each of these roles in a conflict has a unique perspective, which may be
influenced in a variety of ways. How people interpret an act of violence, how sensitive
they are, how likely they are to intervene, whether they condemn the behavior, and
how they would react if they were ever in a similar position may depend on their roles
in the conflict and how it affects them in the moment.
This particular research study aims to determine how different views of a same
violent event can vary depending on the perspective a person has on the event, as well
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as how the person learns about the event. Of interest are not only how differently the
perspectives perceive the violence, but also the variations in violence sensitivity,
empathy, and the words used to retell the story that may be characteristic of each
perspective.
Victims, Perpetrators and their differing perspectives
As you listen to the stories of people retelling a conflict, one of the things that
might be noticed is that stories of the same event can vary from person to person. The
story can vary depending on the role a person played, that is, whether he or she was
the victim, the perpetrator or the bystander. There are several ways a story may vary.
Baumeister and colleagues have done research in order to determine the differences in
perspectives of the victim and perpetrator roles. In his book Evil, Baumeister (1996)
uses the term magnitude gap to refer to “the discrepancy between the importance of
the act to the perpetrator and to the victim” (p. 18). In other words, the victim might
feel the event is really important in the way that it has affected him or her, whereas the
perpetrator might underestimate its importance.
In the study by Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), the researchers
asked participants to write two autobiographical stories, one about when they were in
the position of the victim, and another story where they were in the position of the
perpetrator. Results suggested that participants interpreted the events differently based
on the perspective from which they were retelling the story. One difference between
the two perspectives was in the way participants described or referred to the time
frame of the event. Victims provided a background to the story (Baumeister, Stillwell,
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& Wotman, 1990); not only did they look at the past and possible consequences of the
events, but also mentioned the consequences of the event, and the impact on the
present. Thus, victims have a more comprehensive outlook; they look at the past,
present and future. For the victims, the consequences of the event stay with them
longer, so the time span used to describe the event is longer (Baumeister, 1996). As
for emotions, victims can also feel anger for a longer period of time (Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990).
In contrast, perpetrators saw the situation as a closed event; it had a beginning
and it had an end or closure. Participants retelling a story from a perpetrator
perspective did not provide a background story to the event, and were less likely to
provide accounts of the consequences (in contrast to those in a victim position). The
authors suggested that victims recall a series of events before they express anger
toward the perpetrator; however, the perpetrators do not see it the same way. Rather,
perpetrators only recall the event when the victim draws his or her attention to it, and
might think that the victims are over-reacting (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman,
1990).
The magnitude gap, according to Baumeister (1996) also “involves intangible
factors such as the victim’s suffering compared to the perpetrator’s pleasure” (p. 110).
Baumeister refers to the consequences of an event, as these are usually bigger and
more negative for the victims than for the perpetrator. If the event is considered in
terms of who gains and loses the most, victims are the ones that will lose the most,
while the gain of perpetrators would be minimal. Because the loss of victims is
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greater, it will affect them more, and might make them continually think about the
losses and consequences; this could be considered as a continuation of the event
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). The consequences are a continuous
reminder of what happened, making it difficult to forget the event. The perpetrator,
however, whose loss is smaller, is able to put an end to the event and does not
generally continue to think about the consequences. He or she will also tend to
minimize the consequences, limiting rather than extending the psychological duration
of the “event” itself (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). Thus the time frame of
the event for the perpetrator is shorter than it is for the victim.
Another difference between victims and perpetrators is in the way they
understand why the event happened. The victims perceive the action as something
unexpected that did not have any reason for happening (Baumeister, 1996.) However,
perpetrators do not think the same way, they believe there is a reason for the action.
Perpetrators do not believe it was random, though they can acknowledge that it might
have been impulsive (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). They are also likely to
place the blame on external causes, including the victim; this eases their sense of guilt.
Perpetrators of intentional violence often believe that their actions were just, and that
the victim deserved what happened to him or her.
Stillwell and Baumeister (1997) researched the differences in perspective
between victims and perpetrators. In this study the authors asked participants to retell
a story from the perspective of the victim or the perpetrator. Results showed that
perpetrators emphasized details that would make them look better and avoided details
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that would made them look bad, even if the details were relevant. However, victims
were more likely to change a story to enhance their suffering, and would make the
perpetrator look more responsible for the event. Both roles changed the stories for the
storyteller’s own benefit. Perpetrators would change the story in a way that would
reduce the blame, including the suffering of the victim, and the victim would avoid
mentioning possible justifications for the perpetrator’s behavior, and any other
positive information about the perpetrator.
Jones and Nisbett (1972) also discuss the differences between different
perspectives, but in terms of observers (bystanders), and actors (perpetrators). The
authors discussed how these two perspectives explain the same event or information
differently. Jones and Nisbett suggest the actor is unlikely to focus attention onto him
or herself, and instead focuses his or her attention on the circumstances. However, the
observer tends to focus more on the actors and their personal characteristics than the
circumstances of the event. As Jones and Nisbett stated “there is a pervasive tendency
for actors to attribute their actions to the situational requirements, whereas observers
tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions” (p. 80.) This helps
explain how a person makes dispositional attributions for someone else’s actions when
the actions affect him or her, possibly ignoring the situation the person was in. Or vice
versa, the actor might only make situational attributions to avoid the responsibility for
his or her actions, and ignore dispositional attributions.
The reasons behind the actions, whether it is a person’s own actions or
someone else’s, are understood and expressed by attributions. Attribution, according
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to Fisk and Taylor (2013), “fundamentally concerns how people infer causal
explanations for other people’s actions and mental states” (p. 149.) According to
Heider (1958) there are two main categories of understanding why a person acts a
certain way. A person can place the responsibility of a behavior on the person
(dispositional attributions), outside of the person (situational attributions), or a
combination of both. Dispositional attributions focus on stable personality
characteristics (within the person). Situational attributions focus on the situation and
specific circumstances (outside the person). Thus, someone’s behaviors can be
explained by his personality, at other times the person’s behavior is attributed to the
circumstances, and at other times to a combination of both.
Cognitive Dissonance
As individuals retell the story of what happened - regardless of the perspective
- they might still be in the process of understanding the event and the reasons why it
happened. As they do this, they can experience cognitive dissonance. Cognitive
dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort people feel when they are unable to
easily reconcile their beliefs and actions (Festinger, 1957.) In response to cognitive
dissonance, the person adjusts his or her attitude and appraisals toward greater comfort
in their interpretation of events to be consistent with the observed behaviors.
Both perpetrators and victims can experience cognitive dissonance.
Perpetrators might try to rationalize their actions, or change their attitudes, since they
cannot deny or undo their behaviors. To do this, people can place less importance on
the event than it actually deserves, as suggested by Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman
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(1990). Perpetrators can also assume less responsibility and place the blame on other
people, including the victim. This way, perpetrators can reduce the psychological
discomfort of cognitive dissonance. Besides placing the blame on the victim,
perpetrators are likely to blame the circumstances, thus avoiding responsibility for
their actions.
Victims can also experience cognitive dissonance. It might be difficult for
them to comprehend and make sense of why they are in a situation where they are
experiencing suffering or injustice. It might be difficult for them to understand and
come to terms with the reasons that lead another person, whether it is a stranger or not,
to hurt them. This might be especially true if the victims have a belief in a just world
(BJW). People who believe in a just world, believe that if they do good, good things
will be reciprocated, and good will come back to them, rather than bad things such as
suffering (Lerner & Miller, 1978). Based on the BJW, people believe that those who
suffer are the ones that have harmed others or have done bad things to others. If
victims have not acted in an unjust way towards another person, they might experience
cognitive dissonance. Research by Dalbert (1999) suggests it is important to
differentiate between personal BJW and general BJW. Dalbert suggests that personal
BJW explains good well-being and healthy self-esteem. For people who believe in a
just world and have behaved unjustly, their self-esteem is affected in a negative way.
For people who believe in a just world, out of good actions come good things,
including a positive view of the self, and self-worth. If perpetrators have a BJW and
act in an unjust way towards others or in a way that is contradictory to their views,
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then they could experience guilt and shame; thus their self-worth might be affected in
a negative way. If perpetrators experience these negative effects, then they might try to
reduce the discomfort caused by cognitive dissonance.
Bystanders
So far the discussion has emphasized the variations in the perspective of
victims and perpetrators, but little has been said about the bystander perspective. A
bystander is a person who witnesses an event and can choose to intervene or not. In
order for the bystander to intervene in a situation, Latané & Darley (1968) suggest that
three things need to happen: “the bystander needs to notice the event and interpret it as
an emergency, and he must decide that it is his personal responsibility to act” (p. 220.)
If one of these three things does not happen, the bystander will not intervene and will
remain a passive bystander.
There is an exhaustive body of research regarding the likelihood of bystanders
to intervene in the event of a conflict (see Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley,
1968; Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). Previous research has aimed to understand why
a bystander does not interfere in a conflict. One of the reasons has been termed the
diffusion of responsibility (Latané & Darley, 1968) and it refers to the individual’s
sense of personal responsibility based on how many people he or she knows that are
aware of the situation. If there are many people around them, bystanders do not feel
obligated or fully responsible to intervene because they shift some responsibility to the
other people that are also present or know about the situation. However, if a bystander
believes they are the only one present and aware of the emergency situation, then they
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are more likely to respond (Darley & Latané, 1968; Latané & Darley, 1968). Thus, the
more bystanders witnessing a situation, the less likely a bystander is to intervene and
an intervention will be delayed.
Another reason bystanders might not intervene in a situation is because of
pluralistic ignorance (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973; Latané & Darley, 1968). This
could happen based on the number of people a bystander knows are aware of the
situation. A person might think that if no other bystander interferes, that must mean
the event must not be serious and the situation is not perceived as an emergency
because no one else is interfering or doing anything to stop what is happening (Latané
& Darley, 1968).
Not only does the perception of a bystander in regard to a specific
circumstance vary per individual and the circumstance for the bystander to decide
whether to intervene, but the perception of a bystander can also vary with respect to
the reasons such an event might have happened. The bystander tends to understand the
actions of the perpetrator by emphasizing his or her personality characteristics (i.e. the
bystander makes dispositional attributions), and underestimates the impact of
circumstances (situational attributions) (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). Bystanders not only
try to understand reasons for the perpetrator to act a certain way, but they will try to
understand if the victim deserved such a bad thing to happen to them or not. Victim
blaming is not uncommon, especially in sexual violence situations, where a person
tries to understand such an event based on already accepted rape myths, or the
characteristics of a victim, including gender, sexuality, the relationship between victim

9

and perpetrators, etc. (van der Bruggen & Grubb, 2014).
In the book Getting at Peace (1999), William Ury refers to bystanders as
‘thirdsiders.’ He believes that as thirdsiders people can have an influence in the
prevention, resolution and containment of violence. As he sees it, “the third side is
people – from the community - using a certain kind of power – the power of peers –
from a certain perspective - of common ground – supporting a certain process - of
dialogue and nonviolence – and aiming for a certain product – a “triple win” (p. 14.)
The goal of the thirdsider is to help people who are in conflict resolve differences with
dialogue and avoiding violence (Ury, 1999.)
In order to prevent violence, Ury believes thirdsiders have three roles:
providers, teachers, and bridge-builders. The role of the provider is to help prevent
violence and conflict when the needs of a person are not being met. Ury suggests there
are four needs that have to be met in a person: food, safety, identity and freedom. He
suggests that the role of the provider is to make sure these needs are met. The role of a
teacher is to help prevent conflict by teaching others the necessary skills to help them
avoid conflict: “By helping people learn new values, perspectives and skills, we can
show them a better way to deal with differences” (p. 125.) There are three main things
Ury feels need to be taught: (1) that violence does not solve problems (2) the
importance of tolerance, not to agree but to respect “the essential humanity in every
person” (p. 127) and (3) skills for problem solving. The final role to prevent violence
is the bridge-builder. A way of being a bridge builder is by encouraging dialogue that
will help increase the understanding of the perspective of another person, and increase
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the trust among conflicting parties as well. The purpose of the prevention role is to
reduce already existing conflict, and avoid it becoming an overt conflict.
To resolve violence, thirdsiders can have the roles of mediator, arbiter,
equalizer, and healer. As Ury clearly describes it, mediators “can help reconcile the
parties’ interest. As Arbiters, we can determine rights. As Equalizers, we can help
balance the power between the parties. And as Healers, we can help repair injured
relationships” (p. 142.) In trying to reconcile the parties, the mediator tries to get to the
root of the problem establishing good communication between the parties, and solve it
by meeting the needs of both parties, ignoring whether someone is at fault. The end
goal of a mediator is to help the parties reach an agreement where they are satisfied.
The role of an Arbiter can be used when mediations fails. An Arbiter can help
decide on a solution. Ury also suggests that this role could help “repair the harm to
victims and to the community, and to reintegrate the offender as a constructive
member of society” (p. 150.) The role of the Equalizer can help restore the power
balance that might result in injustice. Finally, the role of the Healer can help to finally
resolve a conflict and prevent it from reoccurring.
Finally to contain violence thirdsiders may play the potential role of witness,
referee and peacekeeper. Ury explains that once a situation escalates, the challenge for
the third side is to “contain the power struggle so that the parties may be brought back
to the negotiation table.” (p. 169.) Ury explains the escalation of an event based on the
Chinese philosopher Mo Tzu, in that violence escalates into overt behavior when “no
one is paying attention to the conflict or, even if someone is, because no one sets
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limits on the fighting, or, lastly, because no one intervenes to provide protection.” (p.
170.) A witness can be aware of early signs that something might get out of control,
but can also call for help if needed. The referee can help by setting fair rules if there is
a fight already. And finally, the peacekeeper can help make sure that peace ensues,
and avoid violence before it starts.
As suggested by Ury, thirdsiders (or bystanders) have many different ways to
act constructively. Ury believes people can play a variety of active roles, and there are
many things they can do. Often people may see overt situations of violence, so the
only thing to do is to contain such violence. Other times, as with our friends, family,
and co-workers people can sense some of the tension brewing, and it would be
possible to prevent such tension from escalating and becoming overt. In many
situations, there is something that could be done to reduce and avoid conflict and
people as thirdsiders have that power.
Human Aggression
Aggression has been defined as the “behavior directed toward another
individual that is carried out with the proximate (immediate) intent to cause harm”
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 28.) It has been emphasized that in order for a
behavior to be considered aggression the action of the perpetrator has to have as a goal
harming the other person, and for the person who the behavior is aimed towards, to
want to avoid it (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Bushman & Anderson, 2001). There
are also different forms by which people can express aggression such as physical,
verbal or relational ways (Bushman & Bartholow, 2009). All of these forms include
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the desire to harm another person. Physical aggression includes harming others “with
body parts or weapons,” and verbal aggression includes harming others with words
(Bushman & Bartholow, 2009.) Relational aggression is somewhat different, the harm
is done is by negatively changing the relationship with others (e.g. Crick & Grotpeter,
1995.)
Aggression has been dichotomized by its function between hostile aggression
and instrumental aggression. Hostile aggression (or reactive aggression) is mostly
“impulsive, thoughtless, driven by anger… and occurring as a reaction of a
provocation” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 29.) Instrumental aggression (or
proactive aggression), refers to aggression that has been “premeditated [as a] means of
obtaining some goal other than harming the victim, and being proactive rather than
being reactive” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 29.) However, Bushman and
Anderson (2001) disagree with the dichotomy between hostile and instrumental
aggression, and suggest instead that there are two major problems with this
dichotomy. One of the problems is that hostile and instrumental aggressions are not
mutually exclusive; some of the motives of aggression can include both hostile and
instrumental aggression.
Another important dichotomy in aggression is the situational vs.
personological causes of aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Anderson &
Huesmann, 2003.) Situational versus personal (dispositional) attributions have been
previously mentioned in this discussion, as ways by which bystanders try to
understand the aggressive behaviors of others. It is important to note that the
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situational and personological dichotomy can help explain why people act in
aggressive ways. Anderson and Huesmann (2003) suggest that personological causes
include “attitude, beliefs, and behavioral tendencies” (p. 299.) Situational causes
however, are specific for every particular situation, and these situational causes can
increase or decrease aggression. These factors might include “insult[s], uncomfortable
temperatures, presence of a weapon, or presence of one’s religious leader…” (p. 299.)
Behaviors result from the combination of personological and situational factors;
whereas situational factors can increase or decrease aggressive behaviors,
personological factors include the readiness of a person to aggress. When these two
combine it can inhibit or increase aggressive behaviors (Anderson & Huesmann,
2003.)
Over the years researchers have developed several theories of aggression,
including Cognitive Neoassociation Theory, Social Learning Theory, Script Theory,
Excitation Transfer Theory, Social Interaction Theory, Frustration-Aggression Theory,
etc. Anderson and colleagues (e.g. Anderson & Bushman, 2002) integrated several of
these theories and developed a framework called the General Aggression Model
(GAM). One of the key features of the GAM is what is labeled as inputs, or what
influences and causes aggressive behaviors. Inputs are divided into two categories,
person factors (traits, sex, beliefs, attitudes, values, long-term goals, and scripts) and
situational factors (aggressive cues, provocation, frustrations, pain and discomfort,
drugs, and incentives). As Anderson and Bushman (2002) mention the “input variables
influence the final outcome through the present internal state that they create” (p. 38.)
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The internal states consist of cognition (hostile thoughts, scripts), affect (mood and
emotion, and expressive motor responses), and arousal. These internal states function
as filters that influence the outcomes of an event.
Anderson and Bushman (2002) also explain that outcomes, including both
thoughtful actions and impulsive actions have an influence “as part of the input” on
future events. Impulsive actions (these actions may or may not be aggressive in
nature) may occur when a person does not have the appropriate resources such as time
and cognitive capacity to understand a situation. With the appropriate resources a
person can reappraise the situation, and act in a thoughtful way (thoughtful action),
that can be aggressive or not.
Violence Sensitivity
As an actor or observer, when a person learns of an aggressive behavior, he or
she can interpret its severity differently than another person, whether they are in a
similar position or not. Violence sensitivity is a measure of the perceived severity of
violent behavior. Using Likert ratings of the severity of many behaviors (e.g. murder,
stabbing, bullying) two scales can be derived. One is a scale of severity, ranging
approximately from murder to gossip. Principal factor analyses has suggested four
categories within this range: V1 – more severe physical violence, V2 – less severe
physical, V3 – more severe nonphysical, V4 – less severe nonphysical (Collyer, Gallo,
Corey, Waters, & Boney-McCoy, 2007). The second scale is violence sensitivity,
which measures individual differences in responsiveness to violence. Cluster analysis
has suggested violence-sensitive (VS) and violence tolerant (VT) groups as a way to
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describe these differences, but it is more realistic to think of sensitivity as a
continuum.
More sensitive individuals are those with higher average ratings of violence
severity across many behaviors. At least this was true for V2, V3, and V4 behaviors;
however, the groups did not vary as much in their evaluations of V1 (see also Collyer,
Brell, Moster, & Furey, 2011) because almost all of the severity ratings for V1
behaviors were very high. Later studies by Collyer and Melisi (2008), and Egan
(2010) have shown that the apparent similarity of the two groups in rating V1
behaviors was a ceiling effect caused by the use of closed-ended Likert scales in the
original study. When open-ended magnitude estimation methods are used, the
expected difference between violence sensitive and violence tolerant individuals is
still seen.
A subsequent study by Collyer et al. (2011) aimed to fully describe individual
differences in sensitivity to violence. Results showed a gender difference with women
scoring higher in violence sensitivity than men. Participants had the opportunity to
classify themselves as violent-sensitive or violent-tolerant, and results showed that
their self-descriptions correlated with their classification using severity ratings. This
suggests some degree of self-awareness regarding violence sensitivity or tolerance. In
the study, the authors suggested that violence sensitive individuals seem to have a
more inclusive understanding of what violence includes, embracing such things as
verbal abuse and inaction.
A study by Collyer, Johnson, de Mesquita, and Palazzo (2010) addressed the
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question of whether people who are violence-tolerant continue to be so after
nonviolence training, or if they can become violence-sensitive. The results suggest that
participants exposed to nonviolence training that learn about nonviolence problemsolving rated violent behaviors higher than before their exposure, and so become more
sensitive to violence than participants who are not exposed to nonviolence education.
Empathy
Empathy refers to the “reactions of one individual to the observed experiences
of another” (Davis, 1983, p.113), and the degree to which individuals can put
themselves in the position of others. Hoffman (1990), similarly to Davis, refers to
empathetic affect as the “affective response more appropriate to the other’s situation
than to one’s own” (p. 157.)
Many times people are empathetic toward others because the other person is
going through a difficult time, and sometimes people might believe the suffering is
unjust. Hoffman (1990) suggests that empathetic affect can lead to “moral
development, and just behavior” (p. 151) especially when it comes to empathic
distress. Empathetic distress, as explained by Hoffman, refers to the negative feelings
caused by another person’s distress.
Hoffman (1990) proposes a series of related affects that result from empathetic
affect. One of them is sympathetic distress, this occurs when it is known that the
victim is suffering, and the suffering is out of his or her control. Empathic anger
focuses on the perpetrator and not the victim. This anger might shift to the victim if
the bystander learns that somehow the victim did something or instigated the
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perpetrator and so deserves the suffering, or if the victim has maintained the status as a
victim for a while, and has not done anything to change it. Thus, the anger might
increase toward the victim, and decrease toward the perpetrator, and the empathy
might increase towards the perpetrator. Guilt feelings occur when the bystander or the
observer is the person responsible for the suffering of the other person; the perpetrator
can experience self-blame, as well as both empathic and sympathetic distress.
Someone might experience empathetic feelings of injustice when there is
inconsistency between the victim’s suffering and his or her behaviors. This could
reflect a BJW, previously discussed. As expressed by Hoffman, “empathic distress
may be transformed by the lack of reciprocity between character and outcomes into a
feeling of injustice” (p. 160.) In other words, if it is believed that the victim is a good
person who does not deserve suffering, the empathic distress might increase, whereas
if it is believed that the victim is not a good person and deserves the suffering; the
observer might not feel empathy towards the victim. This lack of consistency that
leads to empathic distress can change into empathetic feelings of injustice. It is
important to note that there is no need for a victim to be physically present in order for
a person to experience empathy; a person can learn about the victim in some other
ways “because humans have the capacity for representation and represented events can
evoke empathic affect” (Hoffman, 1990, p. 169.)
As suggested by Hoffman, there is a relationship between empathy and
justice/injustice. A recent study by Decety and Yoder (2016) analyzed the relationship
between the different components of empathy (affective, motivational, and cognitive)
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and sensitivity to injustice. The results showed that people who are more empathically
concerned with others, and are less coldhearted (based on the psychopathy scale) are
more sensitive to injustices other people might experience. Results also suggested that
justice sensitivity for others can be predicted when people are more cognitively
empathetic, or can put themselves in the position of others.
Actor vs. agent duality (McAdams, 2013; Frimer, Schaefer, & Oakes, 2014)
refers to the same person being both the actor and the agent. The actor is the “watched
self” while the agent is the “executor of action.” The actors reflect on the morality,
mostly because they are being watched and want to appear as a good person. On the
other hand, the executor of an action might give himself or herself permission to act in
a more selfish way, especially if he or she believes that they are not being watched. In
light of what has been discussed so far, a connection can be made to the actor vs. agent
duality, specifically to the victim and perpetrator perspectives, as well as that of the
bystander. In the case of the bystander, a person could intervene or not depending on
how he or she sees himself or herself in that moment, as an actor (someone who is
being watched), who feels the need to act in a moral way, or an agent (someone who
can act in a more selfish manner). From the victim’s perspective, they might recall
themselves as more morally inclined, since perhaps they think they are being watched,
that someone else at least knows about the injustices committed against them. If this is
so, then the victim might be more empathetic towards others. The perpetrator could be
similar to the agent – the “executor of the action” - someone who behaves more
selfishly and (clearly) less morally. A person can allow himself or herself to not act in
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a moral way, especially if they do not care or believe that there is a bystander
observing those behaviors.
People can be empathetic towards others when they see someone, or read about
a situation another person experiences. This includes reading literary fiction (Mar &
Oatley, 2008). Individuals who create imagery when reading are more empathetic
toward the characters in the story, and are more likely to help, thus showing an
increase in prosocial behaviors (Johnson, Cushman, Borden, & McCune, 2013). Even
though the literature is inconclusive, it points to people being empathetic toward
others in a variety of ways, not only by seeing it, but by reading about it, and
visualizing the scenario.
Use of Words
In addition to analyses of the stories participants have shared, either from
previous experiences in their lives from different perspectives, or because they were
asked to retell a story from a specific perspective, either victim or perpetrator
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Stillwell & Baumeister, 1997), analyses of
the linguistic styles associated with each perspective can help determine additional
differences (Pennebaker & King, 1999), some of which may extend the
characterizations of victim and perpetrator. Research by Pennebaker and King
suggests that people are consistent “across time and situation” (p. 1308) in the way
they express themselves in writing. Pennebaker and King analyzed the words written
by participants from different populations who wrote about different topics in different
contexts.
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A main benefit of writing is its promotion of better health (Pennebaker,
Mayne, & Francis, 1997). The authors suggest that writing promotes better physical
health because of the use of cognitive processing. Cognitive processing refers to (a) a
self-reflective thinking or use of insight, and (b) causal thinking. Word choice offers
clues to this processing; words that refer to insight include realize, see, understand,
and words that refer to causation include because, why, thus.
Pennebaker, Mayne, and Francis (1997) proposed that the way people think,
and the words chosen to express and talk about situations or events can help improve
their health when writing positive emotions. Results showed that the use of “more
negative emotion words and fewer positive emotion words was linked with more
negative outcomes in the month after writing” (p. 866.)
In his book, The Secret Life of Pronouns, Pennebaker (2011) suggests how the
use of some words can vary depending on the person. For example, individuals in
higher positions or in positions of power and those in lower positions use different
words. Pronouns associated with status, power, self-confidence, arrogance, and
leadership include the pronouns I, we, and you (Pennebaker, 2011.) The tense of the
verbs can also change based on the emotions a person experiences (Pennebaker,
2011.) A person who feels angry is more likely to use you, he, and they at a higher
rate, verbs in present tense, and more cognitive words. People who feel happy use we
more often, and concrete nouns. Individuals who feel sad use more I- words, future
and past verbs and more cognitive words. By I- words Pennebaker refers to first
person singular pronouns such as I, me, my.

21

A study by Kowalski (2000) researched the perspectives of victims and
perpetrators regarding teasing. In this study participants were asked to tell two
different stories that they had experienced (similar to Baumeister, Stillwell, and
Wotman, 1990), one where they where teased (victim perspective), and another were
they teased someone else (perpetrator perspective). To analyze the stories Kowalski
used a linguistic analysis tool, the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)
computer program. Results showed that negative emotion words, such as angry,
ashamed, and worthless were mostly used in stories that were narrated from a
perpetrators’ perspective rather than a victim’s perspective. Results also suggested that
victims felt “more negatively” than perpetrators about the experience, and that victims
believed perpetrators do not feel strongly negative about the event. Results also
showed that victims felt more annoyed by the experience than perpetrators, and that
perpetrators felt the experience was more humorous and also felt more guilt about it
than the victims.
Writing about their experiences from a victim’s perspective, participants used
“more self-references” and “more words” (p. 235) than perpetrators (Kowalski, 2000).
However, when writing about their experiences from the perpetrators perspective
participants referred more to others. Kowalski suggests that the low use of selfreferences by perpetrators in their narratives and the report of guilt of the experiences
“may reflect attempts to distance themselves from their personal involvement in the
teasing incident” (p. 239.)
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Research Questions
The current study examined the words used by participants as a function of the
perspectives to which they were assigned. The present study also examined the
relationship of violence sensitivity and empathy based on the different perspectives
assigned. Below are the research questions addressed in the study.
1. Words consistent with higher-status positions. Participants assigned to the
perpetrator perspective will use more third person pronouns, and words in the
present and future focus, than participants assigned to the victim and bystander
perspective. It is expected that there will be significant differences between the
groups, and participants assigned to the perpetrator perspective will use more
words on the categories representative of people in higher status.
2. Words consistent with lower-status positions. Participants assigned to the
victim perspective will use more first person pronouns, and words in the past
focus, than participants assigned to the bystander and perpetrator perspective.
It is expected that there will be significant differences between the groups, and
participants assigned to the victim perspective will use more words on the
categories representative of people in lower status.
3. Group differences in Empathy. The differences in empathy based on the
different perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the media in
which it was presented were examined. Participants assigned to the victim
perspective were expected to score higher in the empathy subscales than
participants assigned to the perpetrator and bystander perspectives.
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4. Group differences in Violence Severity. The differences in violence severity
based on the different perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the
media in which it was presented were examined. Participants assigned to the
victim perspective were expected to score higher in violence sensitivity than
participants assigned to the perpetrator and bystander perspective.
5. Group differences in Empathy and Violence Sensitivity. The correlation
between violence sensitivity and empathy was analyzed. A positive strong
correlation between violence sensitivity and empathy was expected. This
relationship was expected to change based on the perspective assigned and the
media in which it was presented to participants.
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CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

Design
The current study was a between-subject experimental design in which
participants were randomly assigned to one of six groups. The 6 groups represent a 2
X 3 two-way factorial design in which the first factor was the media used to present
the scenario: news video clip or a news article (See Appendix A for the news article
and the link to the video.) The second factor was the perspective participants were
assigned to: victim, perpetrator or bystander.
Participants
Undergraduate students from the University of Rhode Island were recruited to
participate, mostly from undergraduate psychology courses. Participants needed to be
18 years old or older. Participants were mostly females, (n = 210, N = 289) whose age
ranged from 18 to 63 (M = 20.26, SD = 3.41). The participants were Caucasian
(83.6%), Latino (4.9%), and African American (4.5%). Most of the participants were
Catholic (32.5%), Christian (20.1%), or did not identify with any religion (23.9%).
Participation was voluntary and confidential, and in exchange for their participation,
participants received extra credit for the course from which they were recruited.
Procedure
In order to participate, interested participants went to the link provided to
complete the survey located in REDCap (Harris et al., 2009.) Once participants went
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to the REDCap website, they downloaded the Consent Form and agreed to the terms
before continuing. Participants completed a series of demographic items (See
Appendix B) and then were randomly assigned to one of the six groups. Here they
were instructed to either read a news article of the event, or watch a video clip of the
same event and imagine themselves to be in the position of, or in the shoes of Zinedine
Zidane, Marco Materazzi, or the person filming the video. The article participants read
and the video clip they watched was from the France vs. Italy 2006 World Cup
Championship Game. In the final minutes (110th minute) of the 2006 World Cup
Championship Game Zidane and Materazzi started exchanging words back and forth,
and the argument culminated when Zidane from the French team “rammed his head
into the chest” (Moore, 2006) of the Italian player, Materazzi. Participants who were
asked to put themselves in the position of Zidane were the ones in the perpetrator
perspective; participants who were asked to put themselves in the shoes of Materazzi
were in the victim perspective; and the participants who were asked to put themselves
in the position of the person filming the video were in the position of the bystander.
Participants completed a series of open-ended questions about the event they
learned. These questions varied regarding the perspective assigned to them (see
Appendix B for the full list of questions). Participants were asked to describe the
events that led to the fight, to mention what the other player had said or done that was
hurtful to them (in the case of the victims and perpetrators) or what did both players
do that was hurtful (for the bystander). After participants answered the open-ended
questions, a short survey regarding empathy, perspective taking, violence sensitivity,
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and social desirability followed.
Materials
Empathy Participants answered the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)
(Davis, 1980) by answering how much they agreed with each statement using a Likert
rating from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). This scale consisted of 4 subscales of 7
items each. The four subscales included: Fantasy, Perspective-Taking, Empathetic
Concern, and Personal Distress. Davis (1983) analyzed reliability of the subscales by
gender, because of the known differences in empathy between males and females
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Hoffman, 1977). Test-retest reliabilities were high for all
four subscales for genders, males (.61-.79), and females (.62-.81.)
Perspective Taking Participants were asked three questions regarding how
easy or challenging it was for them to adopt the instructed perspective. These items
were measured with a Likert rating from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly.)
Violence Sensitivity Participants also completed the Violence Sensitivity
Scale (Collyer et al, 2007) that estimates how sensitive participants were to violence.
This scale is also a Likert rating from 1 (not at all violent) to 7 (extremely violent).
This scale consists of 16 items consisting of violent behavior words. To this list of
violent behaviors, one more behavior was added, the behavior the participants learned
about, head-butting. Participants were asked to rate this behavior as part of the
Violence Sensitivity Scale. These lists of behaviors include four types of violence: less
severe physical, more severe physical, less severe nonphysical, and more severe
nonphysical (Collyer et al., 2007). The analyses by Collyer et al., suggested two
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groups based on the severity ratings: a violence sensitive group (VS), and a violence
tolerant group (VT), as well as four types of violence V1 – more severe physical, V2 –
less severe physical, V3 – more severe nonphysical, V3 – less severe nonphysical.
Social Desirability Finally, participants completed the shorter version of the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982). This shorter version
consists of 13 out of the 33 original items. In the original version participants
answered in a binary format (true-false) and it showed good reliability (.76) as well as
good validity (r = .93, r2 = .86) (Reynolds, 1982.) For this study participants were
asked to rate how much they agreed with the statements in a Likert-type scale from
1(not at all) to 5 (very strongly).
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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Once the data were gathered, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with the data was
downloaded from REDCap, and uploaded into an SPSS version 23 file. Before
analyzing the open-ended question data with LIWC, the answers to the open-ended
questions were screened for a more accurate analysis. The corrections done to answers
of the open-ended questions included eliminating abbreviations of word and
apostrophe use, and correcting grammatical errors. Participants were excluded from
the sample if they did not answer the questions, “Please describe your thoughts and
feelings just prior to the event,” “Please describe your thoughts and feelings at the
moment of the event,” and “Please describe your thoughts and feelings after the
event,” and did not follow instructions, answered the questions using a different
perspective other than the perspective assigned (i.e., participants who were assigned to
the victim or perpetrator perspective and answered from a bystanders perspective, or
their personal perspective), and participants who answered the questions with only one
word or were extremely vague in their answers. The manipulation check items for
adopting the perspective assigned of the participants who were not excluded from the
sample showed the participants did not experience difficulty adopting the randomly
assigned perspective (M = 3.43, SD = .77).
Once corrections to the open ended questions were finalized, the answers were
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analyzed using the LIWC program (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015.) The
output of this program provides around 90 different variables, and incudes a word
count of the segment provided by each participant, as well as some general descriptors
or categories that include the percentage of words in a category used per sentence,
words captured by their dictionary, and words that are longer than six letters
(Pennebaker et al., 2015). The outcome also provides 21 standard linguistic
dimensions; the ones used for this study were pronouns (personal, first person
singular, third person singular). Categories also included 41 psychological constructs
from which affect (negative emotion: anger and anxiety), cognitive process (insight
and causation), and time orientation (past, present and future focus) were used for this
study. Finally, the LIWC outcome provides personal concern categories, informal
language markers, and punctuation categories, though none of these categories were
relevant for the purpose of this study.
The words of the answers used for the open-ended questions “Please describe
your thoughts and feelings just prior to the event,” “Please describe your thoughts and
feelings at the moment of the event,” and “Please describe your thoughts and feelings
after the event” were analyzed to determine if participants used words at different rates
based on the assigned perspective and media by which the scenario was presented.
Even though these were three separate questions, these were analyzed as one question
or segment in LIWC. This provided a more comprehensive account of how
participants would have felt if they were in the randomly assigned position of
perpetrator, victim or bystander. Before conducting the inferential analyses, the
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dependent variables of interest obtained from LIWC were tested for the normality
assumption by the independent variable of perspective groups (perpetrator, victim, and
bystander). Few of the dependent variables abided by this assumption.
Not all the word categories provided by LIWC for the different perspectives
reflected a normal distribution. The category of past focus was normally distributed
for two of three groups. Bystander had a skewness of .055 (SE = .211) and kurtosis of
.039 (SE = .419), and the victim group with a skewness of .303 (SE = .291) and
kurtosis of .031 (SE = .575), however the perpetrator group was not normally
distributed as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). Personal pronouns were
normally distributed for the perpetrator group, with a skewness of -.322 (SE = .255)
and kurtosis of .636 (SE =. 506), and victim groups with a skewness of .562 (SE =
.291) and kurtosis of .459 (SE = .574), but not for the bystander group as assessed by
Shapiro-Wilk test (p = .030). The category of cognitive process was normally
distributed for the perpetrator group with a skewness of .436 (SE = .255) and kurtosis
of .383 (SE = .506), however it was not normally distributed for the bystander and
victim groups, as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05). The category of negative
emotion was only normally distributed for the victim group with a skewness of .426
(SE = .291), and kurtosis of -.223, SE = .574, but not for the other two group
perspectives (perpetrator and victim). For the category of affect, the perpetrator group
was normally distributed, with a skewness of .340 (SE = .255) and kurtosis of .144
(SE =. 506), and victim groups with a skewness of .042 (SE = .291) and kurtosis of .739 (SE = .574), but not for the bystander group as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test
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(p < .05). The assumption of normality was not met for the other categories: word
count, first person singular pronoun, third person singular pronouns, insight, anger,
cause, present focus, and future focus based on the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05).
Word use based on perspective
Before analyzing all the variables, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to
determine if there were differences within the word count between the perspective
groups levels: "perpetrator" (n = 89), "bystander" (n = 132), and "victim" (n = 68)
groups. Distributions of word count were similar for all groups, as assessed by visual
inspection of a boxplot. Word count was significantly different between the different
levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 8.963, p = .011. Subsequently, pairwise
comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons. Post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant
differences in word count between the bystander (Mdn = 136) and perpetrator (Mdn =
110) groups (p = .015). There was no significant difference between the perpetrator
and victims (Mdn = 117.50) groups (p = 1.00), and between victim and bystander (p =
.135). This suggests that the only difference between the perspective groups for word
count was between perpetrator and bystander perspective.
Words consistent with higher-status positions.
As proposed in the hypothesis, words associated with higher-status position
include higher use of third person pronouns and words with a present and future focus.
This study aimed to determine if the words used by participants assigned to the
perpetrator perspective were similar to those in a higher-status position. Because most
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of the dependent variables failed to meet the normality assumptions required for an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, a series of nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests
were performed.
Personal Pronouns
For the dependent variable personal pronouns (i.e. I, them, her) median scores
were significantly different between the levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 91.854, p
< .001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, and the adjusted p-values are
presented. Post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in personal
pronouns scores for all group comparisons, between bystander (Mdn = 8.32) and
perpetrator (Mdn = 15.85) (p < .001), between bystander and victim (Mdn = 12.84) (p
< .001), and between the victim and perpetrator perspective groups (p = .027).
To determine the differences in the third person singular pronouns category
(she, her, him) between perspective group levels: "perpetrator" (n = 89), "bystander"
(n = 132), and "victim" (n = 68) groups, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted.
Distributions of third person singular pronoun scores were similar for all groups, as
assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. The medians of third person singular
pronoun scores increased from bystander (Mdn = 1.81), to victim (Mdn = 2.08), to
perpetrator (Mdn = 2.27), but these differences were not significantly different
between the levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = .855, p = .652. Even though results
suggest that the median in regards the use of third person singular pronouns is higher
among participants in the perpetrator groups, there was not enough evidence to make a
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significant difference between the different perspectives of the groups.
Present and Future Focus
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine differences between the
perspectives in regard to present and future focus words. Distributions of present and
future focus scores were similar for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a
boxplot. Median present focus (i.e., today, is, now) scores were not significantly
different between the different levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 3.567, p = .168.
Nevertheless, the median scores increased by groups: perpetrator (Mdn = 5), victim
(Mdn = 5.41), and bystander (Mdn = 6.23). Even though results were not significant,
the pattern in the means suggest that contrary to hypothesis, participants in the
perpetrator groups did not use words in a present focus more than participants in the
victim and bystander groups. On the contrary, the median suggests that perpetrators
used words on present focus less than participants assigned to the victim and bystander
perspectives.
For the dependent variable future focus (i.e., may, will, soon), median scores
were significantly different between the levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 7.574, p =
.023. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, and adjusted p-values are presented.
Post hoc analysis revealed no significant differences in future focus scores for the
group comparisons, between perpetrator (Mdn = 0) and bystander (Mdn = .93), p =
.093, between victim (Mdn = 0) and bystander, p = .051, and between the victim and
perpetrator perspective groups (p = 1.00). Results suggest an extremely low use of
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future focus words for all three groups. Results show a trend for a difference between
the groups. However, based on the medians participants in the bystander group
seemed to use the words with a focus on future at a higher rate, and the perpetrators
and victims at a lower rate.
Negative Emotion and Anger
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in
the categories of negative emotion and anger between groups that differed in the
perspective level. Distributions of negative emotion, and anger scores were similar for
all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. For the negative emotion
(i.e., hurt, ugly, nasty) category, median negative emotion scores were significantly
different between the different levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 27.871, p < .001.
Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are
presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in
negative emotion scores for the group comparisons, between bystander (Mdn = 3.67)
and victim (Mdn = 5.77), p < .001, and between bystander and perpetrator (Mdn =
5.97), p < .001, but not significantly different between the victim and perpetrator
perspective groups, p = 1.00. Similarly to the results of affective processes, there was
a difference between participants who were assigned to the victim and bystander
perspectives, and perpetrators and bystander perspective, but no difference between
participants in the victim and perpetrator perspective for negative emotions. The
medians suggest the victims and perpetrators use negative emotion words at similar
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rates that are higher than bystanders.
For the dependent variable of anger (i.e., hurt, kill, annoyed) median personal
pronoun scores were significantly different between the different perspective groups,
χ2(2) = 41.432, p < .001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed using
Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically
significant differences in anger scores for the group comparisons, between bystander
(Mdn = 1.23) and victim (Mdn = 2.43), p = .003, and between bystander and
perpetrator (Mdn = 3.39), p < .001, but no significant difference between victim and
perpetrator perspective groups, p = .055. Similar to the results of affect process, and
negative emotion, there were significant differences between bystander and victim,
and bystander and perpetrator, but no significant differences between the victim and
perpetrator perspective. Based on the median scores it is suggested that contrary to
hypothesis, participants assigned to the perpetrator perspective used more anger words
than victims, and participants in the bystander perspective used anger words at a lower
rate.
Words consistent with lower-status positions
This study also aimed to determine if words used by participants who were
randomly assigned to the victim perspective resembled the words used by people in a
lower-status position. More specifically, it aimed to determine if participants assigned
to the victim perspective group used a higher count of first person singular pronouns,
words with a past focus, words associated with affect, and cognitive words including
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insight and causation words than the perpetrator and bystander perspective groups.
First Person Singular Pronoun
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in
the first person singular pronouns (i.e., I, me, mine) category between groups that
differed in perspective: the "perpetrator" (n = 89), "bystander" (n = 132), and "victim"
(n = 68). Distributions of first person singular pronouns were similar in distribution for
all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median first person singular
pronouns scores were significantly different between the different levels of
perspective group, χ2(2) = 107. 202, p < .001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons
were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. The post hoc analysis revealed
a statistically significant difference in first person singular pronouns scores for all
group comparisons, between bystander (Mdn = 5.42) and victim (Mdn = 9.70), p <
.001, bystander and perpetrator (Mdn = 12.28), p < .001 perspective groups, as well as
between the victim and perpetrator perspective groups, p = .005. Even though the
results suggest a difference between the combinations of all groups, the differences
were not as expected in how much the first person singular pronouns were used by the
different groups. Based on the medians of the groups, participants assigned to the
perpetrator perspective used first person pronouns at a higher rate than participants in
the victim and bystander groups, and participants in the bystander group used first
singular personal pronouns at a lower rate than the other two groups. It was
hypothesized that the participants in the victim perspective would use these words at a
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higher rate, but results suggested perpetrators use these words more.
Past Focus
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in
the past focus category (i.e., ago, did, talked) between the groups that differed in
perspective. Distributions of past focus scores were similar for all groups, as assessed
by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median past focus scores were not significantly
different between the different levels of perspective group, χ2(2) = 1.696, p = .428.
Nevertheless, the median increased by groups, victim (Mdn = 10.63), perpetrator (Mdn
= 10.64), and bystander (Mdn = 11.48). Even though results were not significant, the
pattern of median scores suggests the opposite of the proposed hypothesis that
participants assigned to the victim perspective would use past focus words at lower
rates than the other two perspectives.
Affective Process
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in
the affective process category between groups that differed in the perspective level.
Distributions of affective process were similar for all groups, as assessed by visual
inspection of a boxplot. Median affective process (i.e., happy, cried) scores were
significantly different between the different perspective groups, χ2(2) = 39.735, p <
.001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964)
procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values
are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in
affective process scores for group comparisons between bystander (Mdn = 6.09) and
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victim (Mdn = 9.04), p < .001, and bystander and perpetrator (Mdn = 9.09), p < .001
perspective groups, but there was not a significant difference between the victim and
perpetrator perspective groups, p = 1.00. There was a difference between participants
assigned to the bystander perspective and the other two groups, victim and perpetrator,
but not between victim and perpetrator. Thus, victim and perpetrator used more words
in the category of affective process than bystanders did, and they seemed to use it at
very similar rates. Results do not fully support the proposed hypothesis; participants in
the victim perspective do not use affective process words at a higher rate than
participants in the perpetrator perspective, but participants in the victim perspective do
so more than participants in the bystander perspective.
Cognitive Process, Insight and Causation
A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to determine if there were differences in
the cognitive process category, insight and causation, between groups that differed in
perspective. Distributions of cognitive process scores (i.e., cause, know, ought) were
similar for all groups, as assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Median cognitive
process scores were significantly different between the different levels of perspective
group, χ2(2) = 13.289, p = .001. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons were performed
using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed statistically
significant differences in cognitive process scores for the group comparisons, between
perpetrator (Mdn = 13.16) and bystander (Mdn = 15.37), p = .004, and between victim
(Mdn = 12.25) and bystander, p = .017, but not a significant difference between victim
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and perpetrator perspectives, p = 1.00. Results suggest that participants assigned to the
bystander perspective use more words in the cognitive process category than
participants in the perpetrator and victim perspective, as suggested by the medians.
And though not statistically significant, perpetrators used more cognitive process
words than victims. The hypothesis suggested is partly supported: there is a difference
between the groups’ use of cognitive process words. However, participants in the
victims group do not use more cognitive process words compared to the other two
groups, instead participants in the bystander groups mostly used these words.
For the variables insight (i.e., think, know), and causation (i.e., because, effect)
the median scores were not significantly different between the different levels of
perspective group, χ2(2) = 4.895, p = .086, for insight, and χ2(2) = 1.436, p = .488, for
cause. Nevertheless the median increased by groups for insight (perpetrator (Mdn =
3.03), victim (Mdn = 3.145) and bystander (Mdn = 3.70)) and for causation
(perpetrator (Mdn = 1.43), victim (Mdn = 1.525) and bystander (Mdn = 1.64)). Thus
results suggest that participants in all perspective groups seem to use insight and
causation words at a very similar rate, but it is still seen based on the median scores
that participants in the bystander perspective use insight and causation words at a
higher rate, and participants in the perpetrator perspective use these words at a lower
rate.
Word use based on media
This study also aimed to understand the differences between the two ways of
learning about the head-butting event (watched a video or read a news article), in the
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categories of the words previously discussed. Similarly to the previous set of analyses,
not all the word categories provided by LIWC for media used reflected a normal
distribution. Past focus and regular verbs were the only categories that were normally
distributed for both groups. For the past focus dependent variable, the group that
watched a video had a skewness of .050 (SE = .187) and kurtosis of -.393 (SE =
.371), and the groups who read the article had a skewness of -.032 (SE = .221) and
kurtosis of -.242 (SE = .438), as assessed by the Shapiro Wilk test (p > .05).
The category of cognitive process was also normally distributed for the groups
who watched the video with a skewness of .227 (SE = .187) and kurtosis of -.218 (SE
= .371), but not for the groups who read the article, as assessed by the Shapiro Wilk
test, p < .05. This assumption of normality was not met for the other categories:
personal pronoun, first person singular pronoun, third person singular pronouns,
affective words, negative emotions, anger, insight, causation, focus present, and focus
future based on the Shapiro Wilk test (p < .05). For the variables, Mann-Whitney U
tests were performed given that the dependent variables did not meet the assumption
of normality.
First, a Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences in
the word count between the media assigned to participants (video watched, n = 169,
and article read, n = 120). Distributions of the use of personal pronouns were similar
as assessed by visual inspection. Word count was not significantly different between
participants who watched the video (Mdn = 120) than for participants who read the
article (Mdn = 127.5), U = 10679, z = .770, p = .441. This suggested that participants
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used a similar number of words regardless of how they learned about the scenario.
Personal Pronouns
A Mann-Whitney U test was performed to determine if there were differences
in the use of personal pronouns, and first person singular pronouns between the media
assigned to participants (video watched and article read). Distributions of the use of
personal pronouns, and first person singular pronouns were similar as assessed by
visual inspection. Personal pronoun use was significantly higher for participants who
watched the video (Mdn = 11.41) than for participants who read the article (Mdn =
9.81), U = 8079, z = -2.944, p = .003. First person singular pronoun use was also
significantly higher for participants who watched the video (Mdn = 8.75) than for
participants who read the article (Mdn = 6.71), U = 8229, z = -2.73, p = .006,
suggesting a higher use of personal pronouns and first person singular pronouns in
participants who watched the video.
To determine if there were differences in the third person singular pronouns
category (she, her, him), a Mann-Whitney U test was run. Distributions of third person
singular pronoun scores were similar for both groups, as assessed by visual inspection.
The medians of third person singular pronoun scores increased from participants who
read an article (Mdn = 1.81) to those who watched a video (Mdn = 2.08), but this
difference was not significantly different U = 9298, z = -1.226, p = .220.
Past, Present and Future Focus
To determine group differences in past, present and future focus, a MannWhitney U test was run to determine if there were differences between the two media
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groups. Distributions of past, present and future focus scores were similar for all
groups as assessed by visual inspection. Present focus (i.e., today, is, now) use was not
significantly different between participants who watched the video (Mdn = 5.77) than
for participants who read the article (Mdn = 5.84), U = 10487.5, z = .496, p = .620.
Similarly, future focus (i.e., may, will, soon) word use was not significantly different
between participants who watched the video (Mdn = 0) than for participants who read
the article (Mdn = 0), U = 9745, z = -.612, p = .540. Finally, past focus was not
significantly different between participants who watched the video (Mdn = 11.30) and
participants who read the article (Mdn = 10.90), U = 9204, z = -1.337, p = .181. Thus
results suggest the participants use words of the past, present and future focus at the
same rate regardless of the media by which the learned about the scenario.
Affective Process, Negative Emotion, and Anger
A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences for the
affective process words, negative emotion and anger word use between the media
assigned to participants. Distributions of the use of the affective process words were
similar as assessed by visual inspection. Affective process word use, and anger word
use were not significantly different between participants who watched the video than
for participants who read the article (U = 9084, z = -1.508, p = .131; U = 9564, z = .828, p = .407 respectively.) In the same pattern of previous results, the median use of
affective words for participants who watched the video was higher (Mdn = 8.05), than
for participants assigned to read the article (Mdn = 7.64). Participants who watched
the video also had higher medians for anger words (Mdn = 2.04), than participants
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who read the article (Mdn = 1.82) However, negative emotion words were
significantly higher in the video (Mdn = 5.00), than the article (Mdn = 4.19), U =
8691.5, z = -2.069, p = .039.
Cognitive Process, Insight and Causation
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to determine if there were differences
in the cognitive process category, insight and causation, between the two media
groups. Distributions of cognitive process scores (i.e., cause, know, ought), insight
(i.e., think, know), and causation (i.e., because, effect) were similar for all groups, as
assessed by visual inspection. Cognitive process words were not significantly different
between video (Mdn = 14.63) and article (Mdn = 13.75), U = 9598, z = -.774, p = .439.
Causation words were not significantly different between video (Mdn = 1.53) and
article (Mdn = 1.64), U = 10553.5, z = .599, p = .549. Finally, insight words were not
significantly different between video (Mdn = 3.65) and article (Mdn = 2.93), U =
9244.5, z = -1.280, p = .201).
Even though the use of words was not significantly different for all categories
based on media groups, there is a pattern that shows that for the most part participants
who watched the video used more of these words for all categories, but used a similar
total word count. This is reflected in the word count category where it was significant
that participants who watched the video used more words than participants who read
the article. This seems to indicate that participants who watched the video can describe
what happened in more detail and more words. Participants experienced it differently
based on the media assigned and it was reflected in the use of personal pronouns, first
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person pronouns, and negative emotions.
Group differences in Empathy and Violence Sensitivity
Another purpose of this study is to determine if the different groups defined by
the factors perspective and media differed on the empathy and violence sensitivity of
participants. The following analyses are directed to understand these differences
between the groups.
Group differences in Empathy
Given that participants were mostly female (female n = 210; male n = 77), a
one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run to determine the effect
of participant’s sex on their scores in the IRI. The four subscales of IRI were assessed:
Empathetic Concern, Fantasy, Perspective Taking, and Personal Distress. The
differences between the sexes on the combined dependent variables was significant,
F(4, 267) = 8.031, p < .001; Wilks' Λ = .893; partial η2 = .998. Follow-up univariate
ANOVAs showed that Empathic Concern, (F(1, 270) = 21.496, p < .001; partial η2 =
.074), Fantasy (F(1, 270) = 10.465, p = .001; partial η2 = .037), and Personal Distress
(F(1, 270) = 12.662, p < .001; partial η2 = .045), were significantly different between
male and female of participants, using a Bonferroni adjusted α level of p < .0125.
However, Perspective Taking (F(1, 270) = 1.31, p = .253; partial η2 = .005) was not
significantly different. Female participants scored higher in all subscales of empathy
than male participants (See Table 1).
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for the Scores of IRI
Empathy Subscales
Empathetic Concern
Fantasy
Perspective Taking
Personal Distress

Sex
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male

Mean
3.88
3.55
3.65
3.37
3.64
3.55
2.95
2.64

SD
0.52
0.50
0.64
0.59
0.59
0.59
0.66
0.62

n
199
73
199
73
199
73
199
73

Before examining the differences in empathy between the different
perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the media used for presentation
(read or watch), a Principal Factor Analysis was performed to determine if the 28
items of the IRI loaded on the original subgroups (empathetic concern, fantasy,
personal distress, and perspective taking) using SPSS version 23. The PCA with the
sample of our participants showed five different components (instead of the original
four) with eigenvalues exceeding 1, which explained 19.45%, 12.44%, 8.18%, 7.25%,
and 4.83% of the variance respectively. The scree test (Catell, 1966) also suggests five
components (see Figure 1A in Appendix C), and was further supported by the Parallel
Analysis. The parallel analysis showed five components whose eigenvalues where
higher than the eigenvalues provided by the PCA.
The five-component solution explained 54.76% of the variance; each
component explained 19.46%, 13.52%, 9.05%, 7.59%, and 5.14% of the variance
respectively. An oblimin rotation was performed to help interpret the components. All
components had strong loadings, however not all variables loaded specifically into a
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component, as shown in Table 1A in Appendix C. This interpretation of the five
components was not consistent with the model suggested by Davis (1980, 1983),
where four components are suggested. The correlations between the five factors are
small (Table 2). These results do not fully support the use of the items in the original
subscales as proposed by Davis (1980, 1983.)
A Factor Analysis establishing four components was also performed. The fourcomponent solution explained 49.62% of the variance; each component explained
19.46%, 13.52%, 9.05%, and 7.59% of the variance respectively. Once again, the
items for perspective taking, fantasy, and personal distress, for the most part loaded
together for each factor. For the subscale of empathetic concern, most of the items
loaded on its own factor, with the other items loading mostly with the perspective
taking subscale items (see Table 2A in the Appendix). Not all variables loaded
specifically into the predicted component. This interpretation of the four components
was also not consistent with the model suggested by Davis (1980, 1983). Not all the
items loaded in the expected subscales. The correlations between the four factors are
small (Table 3). These results do not fully support the use of the items in the original
subscales as proposed by Davis (1980, 1983.)
Before proceeding with the analysis to determine the difference between
groups for empathy, normality tests were performed for the four subscales of the IRI.
All of the four subscales were within the normal limits. The normality tests for the
dependent variables were done taking into account the two independent variables of
media and perspective. For the most part the subscales complied with the normality
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assumptions. The subscale of Empathetic Concern complied with the normality tests,
except for the bystander perspective group. For the rest of the subscales, Fantasy,
Perspective Taking, and Personal Distress showed normality for all six groups,
assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05).
Table 2
Component Correlation Matrix With Five-Components: IRI
Component Correlation Matrix
Component
1
2
3
1
1
2
-0.039
1
3
0.163
-0.034
1
4
-0.158
-0.126
-0.125
5
-0.149
-0.194
0.033
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

4

5

1
0.168

1

Table 3
Component Correlation Matrix With Four-Components: IRI
Component Correlation Matrix
1
2
3

Component
1
1
2
0.064
1
3
0.128
-0.057
1
4
-0.188
-0.181
-0.112
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

4

1

A 3 x 2 between groups multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was
performed as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) to determine if there were
differences in variables associated with empathy (empathetic concern, fantasy,
48

personal distress and perspective taking). Two independent variables were used:
perspective (perpetrator, victim, and bystander), and media (read news article and
watched video clip.) Adjustment was made for two covariates: sex and social
desirability. Total N = 289 was reduced to 271 with the deletion of 19 cases that were
missing data. Some of the assumptions for MANCOVA, including the presence of
outliers, were violated.
With the use of Wilk’s criterion, the combined DV’s were significantly related to
the combined covariates, approximate F(8, 520) = 14.20, p < .001, Wilks’ Λ= .67352.
There was a medium effect size (η2 = .18, and CI 95% (.113, .226)) between DV’s and
the covariates. Results suggested no interaction between the independent variables
perspective and media F(8, 520) = 1.26 p = .263, Wilks’ Λ = .96240 in the different
empathy subscales. Results also showed no significant main effects for both
independent variables: perspective (F(8, 520) = .71808 p = .676, Wilks’Λ = .97827)
and media (F(4, 260) = 1.62 p = .168, Wilks’ Λ= .97561). Effect size for the nonsignificant main effect of perspective was, partial η2 = .01, and CI 95% (.000, .017),
for media, partial η2 = .02, and CI 95% (.000, .058), and for the interaction between
perspective and media, partial η2 = .01, and CI 95% (.000, .024). Results suggest no
significant differences between the different groups. Participants scored similarly in
the four empathy subscales regardless of the perspective they were randomly assigned
to, and regardless of the media by which they learned about the event.
To have a clearer understanding of how each subscale of the IRI was influenced by
the independent variables, adjusting for sex and social desirability, a series of
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ANCOVAS were performed. Results suggested that for the scales of Empathetic
Concern, Fantasy, and Perspective taking there were no interaction effects or main
effects for either of the independent variables (media and perspective) (See Table 4.)
The Personal Distress subscale only showed a significant effect for media (F(1, 274) =
5.641, p = .018, with a partial η2 = .020.) These results suggest that participants scored
higher in personal distress when they read the scenario (M = 2.97, SE = .055) than
when they watched a video (M = 2.79, SE = .052).
Results showed some patterns even though they were not significant. The first
pattern shown is that participants in the perpetrator perspective scored higher for all
the empathy subscales, thus suggesting participants in the perpetrator perspective are
more empathetic than participants in the bystander and victim perspective. The other
pattern that can be seen in the results is that participants who learned about the
scenario by reading the article scored higher in all empathy subscales than participants
who watched the video clip of the scenario (See Figures 1-4, and Table 5).
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Table 4
ANCOVA Results for IRI

Empathy Subscales
Personal Distress
Interaction
Media
Perspective
Empathetic Concern
Interaction
Media
Perspective
Fantasy
Interaction
Media
Perspective
Perspective Taking
Interaction
Media
Perspective

df

F

Sig.

partial η2

2/274
1/274
2/274

2.274
5.641
0.540

0.105
0.018
0.583

0.016
0.020
0.004

2/270
1/270
2/270

0.255
1.586
0.931

0.775
0.208
0.395

0.002
0.006
0.007

2/274
1/274
2/274

1.218
1.196
0.320

0.297
0.275
0.727

0.009
0.004
0.002

2/271
1/271
2/271

0.775
0.446
0.581

0.462
0.495
0.560

0.006
0.002
0.004

Figure 1. Mean scores for perspective taking.
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Figure 2. Mean scores for fantasy.

Figure 3. Mean scores for empathetic concern
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Figure 4. Mean scores for personal distress.
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Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations and Standard Errors for IRI Subscales
Empathetic Concern
M (SD)
M (SE)
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Perpetrator
Watched Video
Read Article
Victim
Watched Video
Read Article
Bystander
Watched Video
Read Article

Fantasy
M (SD)
M (SE)

Perspective Taking
M (SD)
M (SE)

Personal Distress
M (SD)
M (SE)

3.79 (.49)
3.93 (.50)

3.77 (.07)
3.89 (.08)

3.50 (.61)
3.73 (.59)

3.50 (.09)
3.69 (.10)

3.72 (.62)
3.71 (.56)

3.67 (.08)
3.67 (.09)

2.70 (.72)
3.13 (.61)

2.75 (.09)
3.12 (.10)

3.67 (.53)
3.70 (.50)

3.70 (.08)
3.71 (.10)

3.51 (.68)
3.64 (.52)

3.52 (.10)
3.66 (.12)

3.60 (.48)
3.63 (.53)

3.63 (.09)
3.61 (.11)

2.79 (.58)
2.90 (.67)

2.78 (.10)
2.95 (.11)

3.71 (.60)
3.85 (.56)

3.73 (.07)
3.87 (.06)

3.57 (.67)
3.49 (.69)

3.57 (.09)
3.50 (.07)

3.45 (.67)
3.65 (.60)

3.50 (.08)
3.66 (.06)

2.89 (.63)
2.84 (.67)

2.84 (.09)
2.85 (.07)

Group differences in Violence Sensitivity
The present study also examined the differences in violence sensitivity based
on the different perspectives (victim, perpetrator and bystander), and the media in
which the scenario was presented (read or watched). First, a Factor Analysis was
performed to see if the items of the Violence Sensitivity Scale would load on the four
categories established by Collyer, et al. (2007). The items in the Factor Analysis with
the sample loaded correctly in the four categories. One additional item was added to
this scale, head-butt. This item was added because it was the event the participants
learned about when they read the article or watched the video clip. This item loaded in
the category expected, V2 (less severe physical).
Given the difference between the sexes of participants in the sample, a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to investigate sex
differences for the dependent variables related to violence sensitivity to determine if
the following statistical analyses should be controlled for sex. The four subscales of
violence sensitivity were assessed: V1, V2, V3, V4. Female participants scored higher
for all four violence sensitivity categories than male participants (see Table 6). The
differences between males and females for the combined dependent variables were
statistically significant, F(4, 277) = 3.316, p = .011; Wilks' Λ = .954; partial η2 =
.046. Follow-up univariate ANOVAs showed that the categories with less severe
violent behaviors physical (V2) (F(1, 280) = 4.785, p = .030; partial η2 = .017) and
non-physical (V4) (F(1, 280) = 9.823, p = .002; partial η2 = .034) were significantly
different. The more severe violence sensitivity categories, more severe physical
violence (V1) (F(1, 280) = 2.376, p = .124; partial η2 = .008), and more severe non55

physical violence (V3) (F(1, 280) = 1.640, p = .201; partial η2 = .006), were not
significantly different. Females scored higher for less severe violent behaviors than
males.
Table 6.
Means and Standard Deviations For The Scores of Violence Sensitivity Subscales by
Gender
Violence Sensitivity
V1
V2
V3
V4

Sex
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male

Mean
6.82
6.75
4.88
4.61
4.33
4.11
3.37
2.81

SD
0.30
0.35
0.91
0.99
1.28
1.32
1.28
1.47

n
206
76
206
76
206
76
206
76

Before conducting a MANCOVA, the normality of the dependent variables
was assessed. The category of Violence Sensitivity, V1, was not normally distributed,
instead it was negatively skewed for all groups assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk's test (p
> .05). This was somewhat expected given the extreme behaviors in this category. The
assumption of normality for V2 was satisfied for the all group combination of
perspective and media, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), except for the
group that read from a bystander perspective, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p =
.009). The assumption of normality for V3 scores was satisfied for all group
combinations of perspective and media level, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p >
.05). For V4, similarly to V2, the normality assumptions was satisfied for all groups as
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), except for the group that read from a
bystander perspective, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p = .001).
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A 3 x 2 between subjects multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA), as
suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) was performed to determine if there were
differences in the violence sensitivity categories based on the perspectives assigned
and the media by which participants learned about the event. Two independent
variables were used: perspective (perpetrator, victim, and bystander), and media (read
news article and watched video clip.) The four categories in the Violence Sensitivity
scale (V1, V2, V3, V4) were the dependent variables. Adjustment was made for two
covariates: sex of participants, and social desirability scores.
SPSS MANOVA was used for the analysis with the sequential adjustment for
nonorthogonalty. Order of entry of the independent variables was perspective followed
by media. Total N = 289 was reduced to n = 280 with the deletion of a 9 missing data.
Covariates were judged to be adequately reliable for covariate analysis.
With the use of Wilk’s criterion, the combined DV’s were significantly related
to the combined covariates, approximate F(8, 538) = 2.16, p = .029, Wilks’ Λ = .939.
There was a small effect size (η2 = .03, and CI 95% (.0, .050) between DV’s and the
covariates. However, there were no significant differences for the interaction between
perspective and media F(8, 538) = .49 p = .861, Wilks’ Λ = .995. The main effects of
both independent variables were not significant: perspective (F(8, 538) = 1.77 p =
.081, Wilks’ Λ = .950), and media (F (4, 269) = 2.14 p = .076, Wilks’ Λ = .969). The
effect size for the interaction between perspective and media was of a partial η2 = .01,
and CI 95% (.000, .009). Effect sizes for the non-significant main effect of perspective
were partial η2 = .03, and CI 95% (.000, .042), and for the main effect of media,
partial η2 = .03, and CI 95% (.000, .068).
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To further understand the effect of the independent variables in the different
categories of violence sensitivity, a series of ANCOVAS were performed. Results
suggested a main effect for the perspective variable for both categories of violence
sensitivity for physical behaviors. For V1 (F(2, 275) = 4.383, p = .013, partial η2 =
.031), and V2 (F(2, 273) = 4.797, p = .009, partial η2 = .034.) For these two categories
there was not a significant interaction between perspective and media, and no
statistically significant main effect for media. The covariate sex was statistically
significant for V2 (p = .044, partial η2 = .015) but not for V1 (p = .169, partial η2 =
.007). However, the social desirability covariate was not statistically significant for V1
(p = .146, partial η2 = .008) and V2 (p = .425, partial η2 = .002.)
Results suggested a significant main effect for the media assigned for non
physical behaviors: V3 (F(1, 276) = 8.867, p = .003, partial η2 = .031), and V4 (F(1,
276) = 6.744, p = .010, partial η2 = .024.) For these two categories there was no
significant interaction between perspective and media, and no significant main effect
for perspective. The covariate sex was not statistically significant for V3 (p = .274,
partial η2 = .005), but statistically significant for V4 (p = .002, partial η2 = .033).
However, the social desirability covariate was significant for V3 (p = .012, partial η2 =
.012), but not significant for V4 (p = .311, partial η2 = .004.) For both categories, V3
and V4, participants who read the article were more sensitive to nonphysical violence
than participants who watched the clip of the scenario.
Thus, these results suggest that both independent variables have different
effects in different categories of violence sensitivity, especially in their physical and
nonphysical distinction. The independent variable perspective showed an effect in V1
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and V2. This indicates a difference in violence sensitivity depending on the
perspectives participants were randomly assigned to, but only for physical violence.
However the independent variable media had an effect in non-physical behaviors, V3
and V4 (more severe non-physical, and less severe non-physical). This indicates that
participants are more sensitive to non-physical violent behaviors when they read the
article instead of watching the video clip.
There were similar patterns in the means of the four categories of violence
sensitivity, although not significant. One of the patterns is that participants in the
bystander perspective scored lower for all four violence sensitivity categories, and
participants in the victim perspective scored higher in all four violence sensitivity
categories regardless of the media by which they learned about the scenario. Another
pattern, similar to the IRI was that participants who learned about the scenario by
reading scored higher in the four categories of violence sensitivity (Table 7, and
Figures 5-8).

Figure 5. Mean Scores for V1.
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Figure 6. Mean scores for V2.

Figure 7. Mean scores for V3.
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Figure 8. Mean scores for V4
A total score for the Violence Sensitivity scale was obtained by averaging
across the 4 categories. A 3 x 2 between groups analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
was performed to determine if there was a difference in violence sensitivity total based
on the perspective and media assigned to the groups. The independent variables were
the perspective into which the participants were asked to “put themselves”
(perpetrator, bystander and victim), and the media by which they learned about the
event (read news article, or watched video clip). The dependent variable was the
overall violence sensitivity score, and social desirability and sex were the covariates.
After adjusting for social desirability and the sex of participants, results
showed no significant interaction effect between perspective and media (F(2, 272) =
.509, p = .602, partial η2 = .004). However, results showed significant main effects for
both, perspective (F(2, 272) = 4.286, p = .015, partial η2 = .031) and media (F(1, 272)
= 8.373, p = .004, partial η2 = .030.). Participants who read the news article were more
violence sensitive, rating the behaviors as more violent than participants who watched
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the video. Results also suggest there is a difference in how severe participants rated
violent behaviors based on the perspective assigned. Participants in the bystanders’
perspective rated violent behaviors lower than participants in the victim and
perpetrator perspectives. Interestingly, the biggest difference, as seen in Figure 9 is
between the victim perspective, with participants reading the article rating the violent
behaviors as more violent (M = 5.18, SE = .15) and participants who watched the
video clip (M = 4.88, SE = .13.) Similarly to the previous analysis of the violence
severity categories participants who read the article scored higher in violence
sensitivity.

Figure 9. Mean score for violence sensitivity total.

62

Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations and Standard Errors for Violence Sensitivity by Groups
V1

V2

V3

V4

M (SD)

M (SE)

M (SD)

M (SE)

M (SD)

M (SE)

M (SD)

M (SE)

Watched Video

6.87 (.19)

6.86 (.004)

4.83 (.88)

4.82 (.133)

4.23 (1.26)

4.21 (.183)

3.14 (1.14)

3.12 (.191)

Read Article

6.86 (.20)

6.86 (.20)

5.01 (.93)

4.96 (.146)

4.59 (1.13)

4.53 (.200)

3.55 (1.44)

3.45 (.208)

Watched Video

6.80 (.29)

6.81 (.500)

4.89 (.79)

4.91 (.150)

4.04 (1.52)

4.07 (.206)

3.11 (1.44)

3.14 (.214)

Read Article

6.88 (.27)

6.89 (.058)

5.11 (.99)

5.13 (.174)

4.79 (1.30)

4.80 (.240)

3.84 (1.62)

3.88 (.249)

Watched Video

6.71 (.40)

6.72 (.043)

4.49 (.87)

4.50 (.133)

3.91 (1.08)

3.95 (.178)

2.91 (1.23)

2.93 (.185)

Read Article

6.76 (.36)

6.77 (.035)

4.71 (.95)

4.72 (.104)

4.29 (1.33)

4.30 (.144)

3.12 (1.30)

3.14 (.149)

Perpetrators

Victim
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Bystander

Relationship between Empathy and Violence Sensitivity
Finally, this research study aimed to understand the relationship between the
subscales of empathy and violence sensitivity, and whether this relationship changed
depending on the independent variables. It was hypothesized that a positive correlation
would exist between empathy and violence sensitivity. In other words, the higher
participants scored in the IRI, the higher they would score in the violence sensitivity
scale; the more empathetic people are, the more sensitive to violence they would be.
A Pearson's product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship
between empathy and violence sensitivity. Preliminary analyses showed the
relationship to be linear with both variables normally distributed, as assessed by
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05), and there were no outliers. There was a significant
Pearson correlation between the Total Empathy and Violence Sensitivity Total (r =
.198, p = .001), but there were no significant correlations between Total Empathy and
Violence Sensitivity Total per groups (see Table 8, and Figures10-16)
Table 8
Correlations Between Empathy Total and Violence Sensitivity Total
Groups
Overall
Perpetrator
Watched Video
Read Article
Victim
Watched Video
Read Article
Bystander
Watched Video
Read Article

r
0.198

p
0.001

0.132
0.180

0.373
0.286

0.306
0.207

0.187
0.286

0.196
0.128

0.055
0.309
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All Groups
Violence Sensitivity Total

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy Total

4

5

Figure 10. Scatterplot overall correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity.

Perpetrator & Video
Violence Sensitivity

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy

4

5

Figure 11. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for
perpetrator and video group.
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Perpetrator & Read
Violence Sensitivity

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy

4

5

Figure 12. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for
perpetrator and read article group.

Bystander & Video
Violence Sensitivity

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy

4

5

Figure 13. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for
bystander and video group.
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Bystander & Read
Violence Sensitivity

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy

4

5

Figure 14. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for
bystander and read article group.

Victim & Video
Violence Sensitivity

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy

4

5

Figure 15. Scatterplot correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity for victim
and video group.
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Victim & Read
Violence Sensitivity

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1

2

3
Empathy

4

5

Figure 16. Scatterplot Correlation Between Empathy and Violence Sensitivity for
Victim and Read Article Group.
There were only two significant correlations within the categories of empathy
and violence sensitivity. The only group who showed significant correlation was the
group of participants who were in victim perspective and read the article about the
scenario. There was a moderate positive correlation between Empathetic Concern and
V4, r(22) = .419, p = .033, with scores of empathetic concern explaining 18% of the
variation in violence sensitivity for less severe nonphysical violent behaviors. There
also was a moderate positive correlation between Perspective Taking and V3, r(23) =
.384, p = .048, with scores of Perspective Taking explaining 15% of the variation in
violence sensitivity for less severe physical violent behaviors. However, after
adjusting for sex and social desirability these correlations were no longer statistically
significant (r(20) = .356, p = .088; r(21) = .296, p = .151, respectively.)
Partial correlations were performed controlling for sex and social desirability.
All assumptions were met to perform a Pearson’s correlation. As can be seen in Table
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9, there were no significant correlations between the empathy subscales (Empathetic
Concern, Fantasy, Personal Distress, and Perspective taking) and the Violence
Sensitivity categories (V1, V2, V3, V4, and VS Total) for any of the six groups based
on the two independent variables (Perspective and Media: Perpetrator-Read,
Perpetrator-Watched, Bystander- Read, Bystander-Watched, Victim-Read, VictimWatched). Results showed that after adjusting for sex and social desirability, the
correlations between empathy and violence sensitivity remained not significantly
different based on the perspective and media assigned to the participants.
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Table 9
Correlations Between IRI Subscales and Violence Sensitivity Categories Per Group,
Adjusted for Sex and Social Desirability
Empathetic Concern Fantasy Perspective Taking Personal Distress
Perpetrator
Watched Video
V1
V2
V3
V4
VT

0.102
0.146
0.020
0.159
0.124

0.107
-0.184
-0.083
-0.079
-0.118

0.069
-0.062
-0.011
-0.053
-0.040

0.029
0.191
0.112
0.212
0.194

V1
V2
V3
V4
VT

0.262
0.032
0.089
0.141
0.127

-0.265
-0.066
0.038
-0.003
-0.018

0.241
-0.095
0.123
0.118
0.091

0.126
0.120
0.249
0.113
0.194

V1
V2
V3
V4
VT

0.237
-0.014
0.110
0.193
0.124

0.148
-0.137
0.176
0.132
0.094

0.083
0.117
-0.093
0.148
0.123

0.021
0.178
-0.008
0.042
-0.011

V1
V2
V3
V4
VT

-0.058
-0.168
0.059
0.046
-0.014

-0.037
-0.049
-0.032
0.000
-0.032

-0.082
0.033
0.034
0.089
0.049

0.116
0.207
0.182
0.177
0.217

V1
V2
V3
V4
VT

-0.063
0.216
0.173
0.186
0.193

0.131
0.151
0.182
0.283
0.239

-0.145
0.053
-0.019
0.166
0.061

0.021
0.116
0.227
0.221
0.214

V1
V2
V3
V4
VT

-0.212
0.241
0.073
0.356
0.231

0.211
0.232
-0.030
0.212
0.164

-0.005
0.296
-0.094
0.293
0.179

0.177
0.188
0.372
0.197
0.273

Read Article

Bystander
Watched Video

Read Article

Victim
Watched Video

Read Article
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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

To gain a better understanding of different perspectives in the interpretation of
a violent event was one of the purposes of the current research. Previous research has
been done to understand the differences between the roles of the actors (Baumeister,
1996; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Kowalski, 2000; Stillwell &
Baumeister, 1997), but not as much for the role of the observers (Jones & Nisbett,
1972; Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008). Two different media methods were used to present
information about the event, so that differences in word usage, empathy, and violence
sensitivity could be analyzed, based on the difference in presentation, and
perspectives.
Previous research has suggested the importance of writing to promote better
health (Pennebaker, 1993; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997), as well as the
differences between words used by people of higher and lower status (Pennebaker,
2011). People of different statuses and different perspectives use different words,
specifically when it comes to their own experiences (Kowalski, 2000). Having a better
and more complete understanding of the differences between the perspectives and the
variations in the way the event is interpreted and understood could help reduce and
prevent conflict. Though there is a basic understanding of the differences between
victim and perpetrator word usage, there is a lack of research on the words bystanders
use and how their word usage compares to the words used by actors (victims and
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perpetrators). Having a better understanding of the words bystanders use could help
understand how bystanders perceive conflict. This information can help shed light on
bystander intervention programs.
The final focus of this research was to better understand the traits of empathy
and violence sensitivity and how these traits reflect the perspectives and media to
which participants were randomly assigned. In sum, the purpose of the present study
was to learn more about the specific differences in interpretation and perception of the
same event based on the perspective provided, and the media through which the event
was presented.
Summary of Results
In the current research, it was hypothesized that participants would use certain
categories of words based on the perspective to which they were assigned. Participants
randomly assigned to the perpetrator perspective were expected to use words similar
to those used by people in higher statuses, but results suggested that was not always
the case. The categories analyzed included negative emotion, anger, and personal
pronouns. Participants in the victim and perpetrator perspectives used words of
negative emotion, and anger at similar rates, and participants in the bystander
perspective used these word categories at lower rates. For the personal pronoun
category, each group was significantly different from the other; bystanders used these
words at a lower rate, followed by the victim perspective, and the perpetrator
perspective used these words at the highest rates.
The words used by the participants assigned to the victim perspective were
expected to be consistent with words used by people in a lower-status position, as
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suggested by Pennebaker (2011). The categories analyzed were first person singular
pronouns, past focus, affective process, cognitive process, insight and causation. The
category of first person pronouns did not reflect the anticipated results; instead
participants in the perpetrator perspective used these words more than participants in
the victim perspective, and bystanders used these words less than the other two
perspectives.
For the category of cognitive process, participants in the bystander perspective
used these words at a higher rate than participants in the victim and perpetrator
perspectives, with these two perspectives using them at a similar rate, and participants
in the victim perspective using them at a lower rate (although not significantly). For
the category of affective process, participants in the victim category used these words
at higher rates than bystanders, however participants in the victim category used these
words at a similar rate to participants in the perpetrator perspective. Results suggest
that for affective process and cognitive process participants assigned to the bystander
perspective used these words at different rates than participants in the victim and
perpetrator perspective. Participants in the victim and perpetrator perspective used
these word categories at similar rates.
In the scenario presented to the participants, both perspectives learned about the
same violent event. The victim got head-butted and as a result, the perpetrator got
ejected from the soccer match. This might explain why there are not clear differences
in the use of words between the victim and perpetrator perspective, and why for the
most part these two perspectives used these words at similar rates. The perpetrators
faced ejection from the match after his action, and the victim was physically hurt; both
73

perspectives had a negative experience in their own way. The assigned victim
perspective might believe he is the “victim”, but the perpetrator perspective could feel
that he is also the “victim” in this scenario. He might believe that he was provoked,
and that being ejected from the game was an overreaction on the referee’s part.
Another possible explanation for the lack of difference between participants in the
victim and perpetrator perspectives could be because both perspectives experienced
something negative, thus placing them on equal grounds.
A pattern in the results showed that participants in the bystander perspective used
words for the categories affective process, negative emotion and anger less than the
other two perspectives. Participants in the bystander perspective used the words in the
cognitive process word category more often than the other two perspectives. Because
bystanders were retelling a story where they were the observers and not the actors, it is
logical they would use first person pronouns, negative emotion and anger words less,
as they were not in the position of experiencing something negative.
This study also aimed to understand the participants’ responses and the words used
based on the media by which the scenario was presented. The same categories were
analyzed and there were no differences between the two groups for most of the word
categories (third person singular, past, present, future focus, affective process, anger,
cognitive process, insight, and causation), suggesting that regardless of the way in
which the scenario was presented to participants, words were used at similar rates.
However, results showed that word categories of all person pronouns, first person
pronouns, and negative emotion were used at different rates. Participants who watched
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the video used more words in all of these categories, than participants who read the
article.
With regard to empathy and violence sensitivity, hypotheses were not fully
supported. The MANCOVA model that tested the outcome of empathy and controlled
for social desirability and sex of the participants, did not suggest an interaction or
main effect for media and perspective. Regardless of the perspective and the media,
there was no difference in the scores of the participants on all four subscales of
empathy. The MANCOVA model that tested the outcome of violence sensitivity did
not suggest an interaction between media and perspective, or main effect for media
and perspective either. Despite participant perspective and provided media, there was
no difference in scores across all four categories of violence sensitivity. However,
when separate ANCOVAS were performed controlling for the sex and social
desirability, results suggested significant main effects for media and perspective.
ANCOVAS were performed for each individual independent variable to better
understand the four subscales of empathy. Results suggested that participants who
read the news article scored higher in personal distress than participants who watched
the video clip. Thus, participants who read the story felt more distress than participants
who watched the video. Although results were not statistically significant, participants
who read the news article scored higher in the other IRI subscales as well. This pattern
shows that participants in this study might get more emotionally invested when they
read, and perhaps are recreating the event in their minds. This result aligns with
Johnson, Cushman, Borden, and McCune (2013), who suggest that individuals who
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read create imagery, are more empathetic toward characters in the story, and are more
likely to help, thus showing an increase in prosocial behaviors.
The results of the ANCOVA analyzing violence sensitivity showed differences
between perspectives for V1 and V2 (the physical violence categories). Participants
assigned to the bystander perspective were less violence sensitive for V1 and V2, than
the perpetrators and victims. However, for V3 and V4 (non-physical violence) there
were significant differences for the media. Participants who read about the scenario
were more violence sensitive to nonphysical behaviors.
Results also showed a pattern, though a non-significant one, that participants
assigned to the victim perspective were more violence sensitive than participants
assigned to the bystander and perpetrator perspective. These results were similar for
three of the four categories of violence severity (V2 - less severe physical, V3 - more
severe nonphysical and V4 - less severe non-physical). There was no difference
between the victim and perpetrator perspectives assigned for the V1 category (more
severe physical); however participants in the bystander perspective were less violence
sensitive to V1. This could be due to the severity of behaviors in this category. To
further analyze violence sensitivity, the violence sensitivity total score was obtained.
Similarly to previous results, participants who read the news article rated the violent
behaviors as more severe than participants who watched the video, and participants in
the bystander perspective rated the behaviors as less severe than participants in the
other perspectives.
Finally, the correlation between empathy and violence sensitivity was analyzed
(controlling for social desirability and sex of participants). It was expected that a
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positive correlation would exist between empathy and violence sensitivity. This
hypothesis was supported upon finding a significant positive correlation between the
empathy total and the violence sensitivity total. However, there were no significant
correlations between the empathy total and the violence sensitivity total for any of the
six groups. There were also no significant correlations between any of the IRI
empathy subscales and violence sensitivity categories for any of the groups. A
possible reason why results did not show differences between groups could be because
of the small n size.
Limitations
The results obtained in this study were not as anticipated, nevertheless there were
some unexpected significant results. However, these findings must be interpreted with
the understanding of some specific limitations. One limitation of the study could have
been the measures used, in particular the IRI (Davis, 1980) The factor analysis
performed for the IRI, showed items that did not load as anticipated; for these
analyses, the model by Davis (1980, 1983) was followed. The lack of a good fit in the
model could also have had an effect on the results. The measures, specifically the
Davis (1980) IRI, might not have been the most appropriate.
Another possible limitation to this study could have been the story presented to the
participants. Even though it was a violent event, it was not an exceedingly violent
event. Participants who are used to seeing violence on TV shows are likely to have
seen far worse violence than what was presented in this study. It is possible that
participants are desensitized to this more mild type of violence. As mentioned before,
the perpetrator in the scenario experienced a negative consequence for his actions, the
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ejection from the game. This could have led some participants to perceive this as if
they were the victims because they experienced some kind of injustice or suffering in
the event. These participants may have seen themselves as equal to those in the victim
perspective. The lack of a controlled environment for participants also served as a
limitation. Because participants completed the survey at their convenience, they could
have been primed to be less empathetic and less violence sensitive if for example, they
were watching a violent TV show at the same time that they were completing the
survey. Another limitation is the homogeneity of the participants. For the most part
participants were female, Caucasian, Catholic and/or Christian. This does not allow
much generalization to other populations.
Future Directions
When analyzing the perspectives of victim and perpetrator, Kowalski (2000),
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990), and Stillwell and Baumeister (1997) had
the participants retell their own stories of their experiences when they were in the
positions of victim and perpetrator. Future studies that analyze violence sensitivity and
empathy could benefit from having the participants recall their own experiences for all
three perspectives. A similar study could also be done in a laboratory setting; that way
the environment of the participants could be more uniform. The lack of fit of the IRI
could suggest that a revision of the Davis (1980) scale should be performed in the
future, so that items could become more relevant to contemporary issues.
An exploratory analysis was performed to determine if the words used by
bystanders were consistent with higher-status positions or lower-status positions.
There is not much research on the words used by bystanders. Future studies could
78

emphasize researching the words that bystanders use, and research whether the words
bystanders use could be indicative of action and intervention on their part. For
example, are bystanders more likely to intervene in a conflict if they use words related
to higher status? The bystander perspective could be expanded to further study
bystander intervention. Having a better understanding of the bystander perspective
could help with the development of interventions and conflict resolution programs.
Conclusions
By learning how different perspectives perceive a conflict, violence could
potentially be reduced by limiting its escalation, by creating awareness in a situation
and knowing how the other person in a conflict thinks and could act. In the case of the
bystander, this person could intervene in a manner that is safe and be that ‘thirdsider’
that Ury (1999) referred. Here is when the understanding of the situation, and of the
other person comes into play. In the case of an actor, to know how your opponent is
possibly thinking can help in finding common ground, where both sides can reach a
resolution.
The results of this study did not suggest that the bystanders were more empathetic
or violence sensitive than the actors (victims and perpetrators). This can be a future
focus for interventions, to create more empathy and more understanding. Possibly,
more empathy towards the actors and knowledge on how to safely intervene, would
lead bystanders to help more. For the most part, victims and perpetrators were
similarly empathetic and violence sensitive. Empathy could potentially help to avoid
violence through understanding the perspective of the other person and trying to find a
middle ground. Even though the results were not as expected, this research provides a
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further understanding of the differences between perspectives, and the relationship
between violence sensitivity and empathy. This knowledge can be applied to violence
prevention efforts.
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APPENDIX A

News Article

At the 2006 World Cup Championship Game, Zinedine Zidane, the attacking
midfielder of the French team, “rammed his head into the chest” (Moore, 2006) of the
opposing Italian player, Marco Materazzi, in the final minutes of the World Cup
championship game (Moore, 2006).
The game was broadcast on television, and it showed the incident. It all began
when Materazzi a player from the Italian team, pulled Zidane’s jersey. After Materazzi
lets go of Zidane’s jersey, both players exchanged some words. Zidane runs past
Materazzi a few meters, while they keep exchanging words, and then runs back
towards him and rams his head on his chest; making the Italian player, Materazzi, fall
to the ground. Following the incident, the referee gave Zidane a red card, which got
him sent off the match in the 110th minute of his last game before he retired (Moore,
2006; Pugmire, 2006).
“Zidane had no compliments for Materazzi. "I know that my act is
unforgivable," Zidane said in an interview. "I'm just saying that the real culprit should
be punished. And the culprit is the one who provokes" (Moore, 2006).
Video Clip
Video Internet Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAjWi663kXc
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APPENDIX B

Instructions

Instructions for the News Article:
Perpetrator Perspective
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty
minutes to complete the study.
Please take a moment to read the news article below, and imagine you are in the
position or in the shoes of Zinedine Zidane.
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read, and try to
identify with Zinedine Zidane, before reading it once more.
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read before
answering the following questions. While you recall the story you just read try to
imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Zinedine Zidane.
Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize how
you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person.
Victim Perspective
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of
thirty minutes to complete the study.
Please take a moment to read the news article below, and imagine you are in the
position or in the shoes of Marco Materazzi.
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Please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read, and try to
identify with Marco Materazzi before reading it once more.
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read before
answering the following questions. While you recall the story you just read try to
imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Marco Materazzi.
Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize how
you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person.
Bystander Perspective
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of
thirty minutes to complete the study.
Please take a moment to read the news article below, and imagine you are in the
position or in the shoes of the person filming the video.
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read, and try to
identify with the person filming the video, before reading it once more.
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the story you just read before
answering the following questions. While you recall the story you just read try to
imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of the person
filming the video. Try to recall as many details as possible of the information
presented; visualize how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that
person
Instructions for the Video Clip:
Perpetrator Perspective
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In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty
minutes to complete the study.
Please take a moment to watch the following video clip, and imagine you are in
the position or in the shoes of the Zinedine Zidane (the player from the French team
wearing the white jersey with the number 10).
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched, and try to
identify with Zinedine Zidane (the player from the French team wearing the white
jersey with the number 10) before reading it once more.
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched
before answering the following questions. While you recall the clip you just watched,
try to imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Zinedine
Zidane (the player from the French team wearing the white jersey with the number
10). Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize
how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person.
Victim Perspective
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty minutes
to complete the study.
Please take a moment to watch the following video clip, and imagine you are in
the position or in the shoes of Marco Materazzi (the player from the Italian team
wearing the blue jersey with the number 23).
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched, and try to
identify with Marco Materazzi (the player from the Italian team wearing the blue
jersey with the number 23) before reading it once more.
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Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched
before answering the following questions. While you recall the clip you just watched,
try to imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of Marco
Materazzi (the player from the Italian team wearing the blue jersey with the number
23). Try to recall as many details as possible of the information presented; visualize
how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that person.
Bystander Perspective
In order to complete study we ask that you separate a time block of thirty minutes
to complete the study.
Please take a moment to watch the following video clip, and imagine you are in
the position or in the shoes of the person filming the video.
Please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched, and try to
identify with the person filming the video before reading it once more.
Finally, please take a moment to recall and visualize the clip you just watched
before answering the following questions. While you recall the clip you just watched,
try to imagine how would you think and feel if you were in the position of the person
filming the video. Try to recall as many details as possible of the information
presented; visualize how you would think, and feel, if you stood in the shoes of that
person.
Instruments/ Questionnaire
I. Demographics
1. Age
2. Gender
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3. Race
4. Major
5. Religion
6. Do you play contact/competitive sports (i.e., football, soccer, basketball,
rugby, lacrosse, boxing, hockey, etc.)?
7. Political Affiliation
II. Questions about the video watched/ news article read:
1. What events led to the fight? (All Perspectives)
2. What did the other player said or did that was hurtful to you? (Victim and

Perpetrator Perspectives)
3. What did Zinedine Zidane (the French player who headbutted the other player)

say or do that was hurtful? (Bystander Perspective)
4. What did Marco Materazzi (the Italian player who was headbutted) say or do

that was hurtful? (Bystander Perspective)
5. Please describe your thoughts and feelings just prior to the event. (Please be as

thorough as possible and use complete sentences.) (All Perspectives)
6. Please describe your thoughts and feelings at the moment of the event. (Please

be as thorough as possible and use complete sentences.) (All Perspectives)
7. Please describe your thoughts and feelings after the event. (Please be as

thorough as possible and use complete sentences.) (All Perspectives)
8. Do you expect any disciplinary actions to take place for the person you were in

the "shoes of"? (Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives)
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?
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b. Please explain why not.
9. Do you expect any disciplinary action to take place for the other person

involved in the incident? (Victim and Perpetrator Perspectives)
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?
b. Please explain why not.
10. Do you expect any disciplinary action to take place for Zinedine Zidane (the

French player who headbutted the other player)? (Bystander Perspective)
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?
b. Please explain why not.
11. Do you expect any disciplinary action to take place for Marco Materazzi (the

Italian player who was headbutted)? (Bystander Perspective)
a. What are some of the consequences you expect will take place?
b. Please explain why not.

III. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980)
On a scale from 1(does not describe me) to 5 (describes me), please rate the following
statements
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen
to me.
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view.
4. Sometimes I don’t feel sorry for other people when they are having problems.
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.
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7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don’t often get
completely caught up in it.
8. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward
them.
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional
situation.
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look
from their perspective.
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for
me.
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
14. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
15. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to
other people’s arguments.
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much
pity for them.
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergency.
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
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23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a
leading character.
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies.
25. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a
while.
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if
the events in the story were happening to me.
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in
their place.
IV. Adopting perspectives
On a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please rate the following
statements as they apply to you.
1. It was very difficult for me to adopt the instructed perspective.
2. I did not have any difficulty adopting the instructed perspective.
3. It was very easy for me to adopt the instructed perspective.
V. Violence Sensitivity Scale (Collyer et al., 2007)
On a scale from 1(not violent at all) to 7 (extremely violent), please rate the following
behaviors.
1. The incident you just learnt about.
2. Pushing
3. Murder
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4. Shooting
5. Stealing
6. Slapping
7. Cursing
8. Kidnapping
9. Vandalism
10. Sabotage
11. Stabbing
12. Gossip
13. Rudeness
14. Manipulation
15. Fighting
16. Hitting
17. Screaming
VI. Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982)
On a scale from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please rate the following
statements as they apply to you:
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged.
2. I often times feel resentful when I don’t get my way.
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I though too
little of my ability.
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority
even though I knew they were right.
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5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
7. I’m always willing to admit when I make a mistake.
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my
own.
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.
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APPENDIX C

Screeplot: Empathy
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Figure 1A. PCA Screeplot of the IRI
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Table 1A
Patterns of Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Five-Factor Solutions
of Empathy (IRI) Item
Pattern coefficient
Item #

Component 1

25

0.767

28

0.721

8

0.684

21

0.682

11

0.639

Component 2

Component 3

3

0.439

0.386

15

0.391

0.304

24

0.792

19

0.763

6

0.707

27

0.701

17

0.606

14

Component 4

0.305

-0.366
0.743

18

0.702

13

0.387

0.605

12

0.509

-0.506

7

0.486

-0.471

4

Component 5

0.356

22

0.479
0.302

0.355

16

-0.815

5

-0.75

23

-0.736

26

-0.731

1

-0.626

9

-0.615

10
2

0.309
0.325

-0.544
0.367

20

-0.480
-0.302

93

-0.361

Table 1A
Patterns of Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Five-Factor Solutions
of Empathy (IRI) Item (Continuation)
Structure Coefficient
Item #

Component 1

Component 2

Component 3

Communalities

Component 4

Component 5

25

0.733

0.599

28

0.725

0.548

8

0.685

0.498

21

0.725

11

0.688

3

0.450

0.448

0.470

15

0.405

0.385

0.358

-0.340

0.563
0.546

24

0.805

0.674

19

0.700

0.624

6

0.735

0.566

27

0.716

0.570

17

0.678

14
18
13

0.390

-0.463

0.589

0.753

0.574

0.694

0.576

0.535

0.531

12

0.571

-0.485

0.635

7

0.517

-0.458

0.518

4

0.385

22

0.387

0.430

0.528
0.325

-0.339

0.451

16

-0.796

0.672

5

-0.761

0.582

23

-0.768

0.617

26

-0.761

0.605

0.413

1
9

0.326

10

0.426

2

0.468

0.413

20

0.416

0.361

94

-0.452

-0.675

0.484

-0.615

0.479

-0.600

0.473

-0.520

0.568

-0.458

0.534

Table 2A
Patterns of Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Four-Factor Solutions of Empathy (IRI) Item
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Item
#
28
25
11
8
21
2
9
20
24
17
6
27
19
10
1
14
18
13
4
12
7
3
15
22
16
5
23
26

Component
1
0.731
0.697
0.696
0.694
0.693
0.498
0.456
0.395

0.328

Pattern Coefficient
Component
Component
2
3

Component
4

0.335
-0.326
0.761
0.750
0.728
0.656
0.650
0.530
0.334

0.491

0.316
0.329

Component
1
0.726
0.690
0.724
0.677
0.707
0.571
0.489
0.504

0.364
0.741
0.676
0.558
0.549
0.541
0.485
0.465
0.393
0.374

Structure Coefficient
Component
Component
2
3

0.402
0.349

-0.493
-0.478
0.321
0.395

-0.469

0.769
0.753
0.737
0.684
0.598
0.564
0.394

0.430

-0.797
-0.749
-0.734
-0.733

Communalities
Component
4

0.358

0.748
0.687
0.492
0.560
0.583
0.509
0.496
0.431
0.412

-0.466
-0.455

-0.331
-0.785
-0.759
-0.767
-0.763

0.530
0.485
0.544
0.485
0.558
0.474
0.265
0.507
0.620
0.568
0.550
0.502
0.485
0.351
0.314
0.567
0.496
0.516
0.367
0.614
0.517
0.434
0.256
0.446
0.644
0.579
0.615
0.604
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